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1. Introduction
Venture capital funds often invest in a portfolio of young ﬁrms engaged in similar projects,
and subsequently VC funds grant further ﬁnancing to only a very few of them deemed to have
the highest potential. In internal capital markets, divisions submit competing budget requests to
headquarters, who then engage in picking winners. Firms often organize innovation contests, where
independent teams of engineers and scientists submit their solutions to technical problems. Then
the ﬁrm chooses the best solution and the winning team receives a prize. All these situations are
examples where the investor has to provide incentives for innovators to work hard and to relay
their knowledge truthfully. In this paper we study how competition between innovators changes
the compensation oﬀered to them and the timing of investments. Our main results show that due to
competition, innovators’ compensation becomes less sensitive to the revenues and that investments
occur earlier.
The scenario we have in mind is where innovators – entrepreneurial ﬁrms, corporate divisions,
teams of engineers and scientists – have to exert costly eﬀort in order to come up with an investment
proposal. While working on the project, innovators also learn privately how expensive it is to invest.
The investor – a VC fund, corporate headquarters, R&D management – oﬀers contracts that solve
these moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
We employ a real options framework where investments are irreversible and the investor has
to decide when to invest. An innovator has an incentive to inﬂate the costs if he thinks he will
be awarded the contract: by declaring a high cost for the project the innovator can capture a
diﬀerence between the declared and the true cost for himself. The investor can use two tools to
solve this problem: provide higher compensation if the declared investment cost is low and delay
the investment if the declared cost is high. By delaying the expensive investment the investor lowers
the present value of the innovator’s compensation, thus reducing the innovator’s incentive to lie
about the true cost of investing.
We formulate a principal-multiple agents model, in which the principal – the investor – can
choose the number of agents – innovators – she can oﬀer the contract to. The single agent case
has been previously analyzed by Grenadier and Wang (2005). We add a feature from auction
theory where agents compete to obtain an incentive contract, as described in Klemperer (1999)
and Laﬀont and Tirole (1987). A key insight in our model is that when innovators have to compete
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for a contract, their incentive to inﬂate costs is diminished. Each innovator would like to declare
that the investment is expensive even if it is not the case and thus capture extra compensation
for himself. This incentive to inﬂate the cost of investment is reduced by the presence of many
innovators competing for the contract: by falsely declaring a high cost, an innovator would end up
losing the contract to another agent that truthfully revealed his low cost.
Competition for contracts and the resulting erosion of informational rents has two implications:
Firstly, the investment would not be delayed as much as it would have to be in the one agent case.
As informational rents are decreasing in the number of innovators participating in the competition,
it follows that investment delays are also decreasing in the number of innovators. Secondly, the
winning innovator’s compensation becomes less sensitive to the cash ﬂows from the investment.
To induce the innovator not to inﬂate the cost the investor has to promise compensation that is
increasing in the cash ﬂows. The need for this also diminishes with competition.
We then proceed to show that when the investor can choose the number of innovators she will
contract with, there are no investment delays, i.e., ﬁrst best investment policy is always achieved.
Thus the informational rents have been completely eroded by competition. The agency problems
are reduced to a pure moral hazard problem where the investor only needs to worry about providing
incentives for the innovators to put in the high eﬀort. As a consequence, the winning innovator’s
compensation becomes completely insensitive to the cash ﬂows. No extra compensation is needed
even for very valuable investments. The reason is that in a competition the winner receives the
eﬀort costs of all the participating innovators. Then winning the competition becomes so valuable
that the expected value of inﬂating the investment cost is not enough to compensate for potentially
losing the competition because of it.
We show that the optimal number of innovators is decreasing in eﬀort costs. With very high
eﬀort costs, a single innovator is enough to achieve ﬁrst best investment policy. Also, the harder
the task, the more innovators should be invited to participate in the competition. The reason is
that with an easy task (high ex-ante probability of a having a low cost investment), it is more
likely that several innovators come up with low cost projects. Thus it is not worth the risk for any
innovator to inﬂate the costs and likely lose the contract because of that. As a result, the investor
can save some money by inviting fewer participants.
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Interestingly, we also show that the optimal number of innovators is decreasing in the volatility
of the project. When volatility increases, the value of the investment option increases for both the
low cost and high cost projects. However, the diﬀerence in value between these projects decreases.
As a result the innovators would have less of an incentive to inﬂate the costs, leading to shorter
investment delays. To accommodate this, the investor has an incentive to decrease the number of
agents. Consequently, the outcome remains as a pure moral hazard problem.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review, whereas Section
3 outlines the model. Section 4 derives the investment triggers and expected compensations for
innovators, and in Section 5 we implement the optimal sharing rule between the investor and the
innovator awarded the contract. Section 6 optimizes the investor’s value with respect to the number
of innovators invited to participate. Section 7 discusses the comparative statics results, and Section
8 concludes.
2. Literature review
Our paper builds on the work by Laﬀont and Tirole (1987). In the static model of Laﬀont and
Tirole ﬁrms know their types in the contracting stage, whereas in our dynamic model contracting
occurs under symmetric information. The key diﬀerence, however, is that in Laﬀont and Tirole
the agents do not have to provide costly eﬀort to come up with a project. Thus in their model the
optimal number of competing agents is always inﬁnity. In our model with costly eﬀort informational
rents are completely dissipated with a ﬁnite number of agents. As a consequence, we are able to
derive novel results showing that the optimal number of agents changes depending of the diﬃculty
of the task or the volatility of the cash ﬂow from the new project. In addition, in our dynamic
model we are able to show that ﬁrst-best investment timing is always achieved when the principal
gets to choose the number of agents.
This paper is related to the part of VC literature that deals with VC’s portfolios and their optimal
sizes. In our model the oﬀer to participate and work on a project proposal can be thought of as
a start-up investment. Then the subsequent competition and investment is like staged investment
in VC ﬁnancing: portfolio ﬁrms compete against each other and only the best one gets further
ﬁnancing. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003, 2004) were the ﬁrst ones to introduce the concept
of optimal portfolio size in VC ﬁnancing. The VC would like to have a large portfolio, but having
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to advice too many companies would dilute the value of costly advice that the VC gives to its
portfolio companies. The size of the portfolio increases in the proﬁtability of portfolio companies,
but declines in the size of initial investment and the eﬀort cost of the entrepreneur1.
Inderst, Mueller, and Mu¨nnich (2007) explore the incentive beneﬁts of constrained VC ﬁnancing.
In their model with ﬁxed portfolio size Inderst et al. (2007) let the VC limit the amount of ﬁnancing
that is available for its ﬁrms. The creation of shallow pockets forces the portfolio ﬁrms to work
hard and compete against each other in order to receive scarce ﬁnancing. The trade-oﬀ is that good
ﬁrms might not get ﬁnancing at all2. Our paper provides a complimentary rationale for the shallow
pockets argument: competition for scarce resources eliminates the informational rents portfolio
ﬁrms enjoy.
To the extent that experienced VC ﬁrms invest in larger portfolios, Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011)
provide evidence on entrepreneurial compensation that is consistent with our model. According
to Bengtsson and Sensoy, experienced VCs are willing to settle for less downside protection in
their ﬁnancial contracts. We derive a similar results: when cash ﬂows are low, investor’s share is
decreasing in number of competitors.
Our model is also connected to the literature on how ﬁrms allocate resources internally. Baiman,
Rajan, and Saouma (2007) model the ﬁrm’s internal resource allocation as an auction. Like in our
model, the agents in Baiman et al. (2007) – divisional managers – have to exert costly eﬀort to
come up with a project. Then the divisional managers learn privately their costs of completing
the projects. Baiman et al. (2007) don’t consider the possibility that the ﬁrm could oﬀer diﬀerent
contracts to divisional managers based on their realized costs, like we do. In contrast, Baiman et al.
(2007) only allow for ﬁxed completion bonuses. The ﬁrm has an incentive to choose a bonus that
is too low to achieve optimal investments. Thus in Baiman et al. (2007) there are too few project
completions, that would correspond to investment delays in our model.
In a related paper, Chen (2007) shows that auctioning oﬀ supply contracts can lead to optimal
allocations. The ﬁrm commits to an auction where it speciﬁes a price for each quantity that it is
1Bernile, Cumming, and Lyandres (2007) extend the approach of Kanniainen and Keuschnigg by endogenizing the
sharing rule between the entrepreneur and the VC.
2In contrast, Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) provide a model where small VC portfolios enhance the incentives of
entrepreneurs to exert eﬀort ex-ante. Large and focused portfolios improve the ex-post resource allocation. Large
portfolios are optimal when ﬁrms are risky and their technologies are related, but small portfolios dominate when
ﬁrms have high expected returns.
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willing to buy. Privately informed suppliers submit bids for these contracts and the highest bid
wins the contract. Chen shows that suppliers have an incentive to reveal their private information,
just like in our model. In contrast to our model, there is no moral hazard and thus suppliers don’t
have to be compensated for their costly eﬀorts.
In addition our paper is related to the literature on innovation contests. In an innovation contest
the ﬁrm has an R&D problem and organizes a contest for outside agents to solve the technical
problem. The agents submit their solutions and the agent that comes up with the best solution
wins the pre-speciﬁed prize. Innovation contests may lead to underprovision of costly eﬀort, but the
upside is that the ﬁrms may receive an outstanding solution to its technical problem. The problem of
a lower equilibrium eﬀort can be mitigated by switching from ﬁxed prize to performance contingent
prize, as pointed out by Terwiesh and Xu (2008). Empirically, Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani
(2011) show that for less uncertain problems, the eﬀort reducing eﬀect of contests dominates, but
for more uncertain problems the increased likelihood of an extreme solution makes organizing a
contest worthwhile.
Bouvard (2010) too studies agency problems where the investment is a real option. He assumes
that an entrepreneur also possesses private information about the quality of her project. In his
signaling model, high quality projects are delayed, as opposed to our screening model, where lower
quality projects may be delayed. Bouvard doesn’t consider moral hazard issues nor the eﬀects
of competition. Morellec and Schu¨rhoﬀ (2011) and Bustamante (2012) also develop real options
models with signaling where ﬁrms have an incentive to speed up investments in order to convey
positive information and thus gain access to ﬁnancing with more lucrative terms. Grenadier and
Malenko (2011) provide a more general real options model with signaling where ﬁrms have either
an incentive to speed up investments or delay them. Firms will speed up investments if they beneﬁt
from highly valued projects, whereas they delay investments if they beneﬁt from low valuations.
We are not the ﬁrst ones to consider auctions in a real options framework. Board (2007) develops
a model where a seller auctions oﬀ an asset – land, oil ﬁelds – among multiple agents and the winning
agent chooses when to develop the asset. The agents have private information about the revenues
that the asset can bring in. The revenue maximizing auction combines an up-front bid and a
contingent fee paid when the agent starts using the asset. The contingent fee leads to delay of
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usage of the asset. The model of Board doesn’t consider a moral hazard problem and also the
number of agents participating in the auction is ﬁxed.
While we consider the eﬀects of competition in a model where a ﬁrm needs an agent to manage an
investment, competition in product markets also has an eﬀect on option exercise. Grenadier (2002)
employs a standard real options model of investment, except that several ﬁrms hold these options
and the value of these options depend on whether other ﬁrms exercise their options. Grenadier
shows that competition erodes the value of waiting and ﬁrms invest at close to zero net present value
threshold. However, Novy-Marx (2007) demonstrates that when ﬁrms’ production technologies
diﬀer ﬁrms have an incentive to delay investments, even in the case that competition has eroded
all the oligopoly proﬁts.
Eﬀects of competition on investment timing is also discussed in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003).
They assume that each competitor knows his own investment cost, but not the competitors’ cost
levels. A similarity to our model is that only the winner of the game can realize his investment
project: the competitors lose the option to invest when the ﬁrst investor has realized his investment
project and thus captured the whole market. The focus in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) is
diﬀerent from ours as they discuss the trade-oﬀ between postponing the investment to maximize the
option value and invest early to preempt competitors’ from investing ﬁrst. However, in both models
competition reduces each competitor’s option value: in our model competition reduces informational
rents, and in Lambrecht and Perraud’s model it reduces monopoly rents of an investment option.
3. Setup of the model
The optimization problem of the investor is formulated in a principal-multiple agents framework,
in which agents obtain private information about the quality of their respective investment projects
after they have exerted unobservable eﬀorts. In our exposition, the term ”innovators” refers to
agents, and the ”investor” is the principal. In this section we start with a description of the
innovators’ projects. We then go on to provide a benchmark of the investment problem: the value
of an innovation when there are no problems with respect to private information and moral hazard.
Finally, we present the full private information and hidden eﬀort problem faced by the investor.
An investor seeks to invest in an innovative project and invites n innovators to come up with
project proposals. Initially we analyze the situation in which n is ﬁxed, but in Section 6 we
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endogenize n. At the time of the invitation, the investor announces that she will invest in one of
the proposed projects, and oﬀers a pre-speciﬁed contract to the innovator with the best proposal.
We assume that the investor is able to commit to the terms of the contract oﬀered. All parties are
risk neutral. We also assume that innovators do not have any initial wealth and that they have
limited liability, implying that innovators’ compensation has to be non-negative.
The innovators’ projects are developed through two phases. In the ﬁrst phase each innovator
has to provide eﬀort to come up with a proposal. The higher the eﬀort of an innovator, the higher
is the probability that he is able to develop a good project. The quality of the project is privately
revealed to the innovator after he has exerted eﬀort.
In the second phase the winner of the contract is selected based on the submitted business
proposals. If the investor chooses to invest in project i at time t, the payoﬀ from the project is
equal to Xt − Ki, where Xt is a stochastic variable that is observable to all parties, and Ki is
privately observed by innovator i. We interpret Xt as the time t value of future, uncertain cash
ﬂows, that represents gross proﬁts from a monopoly. Ki as the investment cost of innovator i’s
project. The stochastic variable, Xt, is driven by the process,
(1) dXt = μXtdt+ σXtdWt,
where μ is the expected change in Xt per period, σ is the volatility, or standard deviation, per unit
of time, and dWt is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Let X denote the asset value at
time 0, i.e., X ≡ X0, and assume there is no traded asset that is perfectly correlated with the cash
ﬂows from the project.
As Xt changes stochastically over time, we maximize the project value by ﬁnding the optimal
time to invest in the project. This means that we allow for the possibility that it may be optimal to
postpone the investment. The investment options are assumed to be perpetual. We assume r > μ
to ensure that it will be optimal to invest at some future time (if the growth rate μ is larger than
the discount rate r it is always optimal to postpone the investment).
The investment cost for innovator i, Ki, can take one of two values, K
G or KB, with KB−KG >
0. We interpret KG as draw of a high quality (or a ”good”) project, i.e. a project with a low
investment cost. Analogously, KB refers to a high investment cost, which means that it is a low
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quality (or a ”bad”) project. By exerting eﬀort innovator i can inﬂuence the probability of the
level of the investment cost, Ki.
Initially, innovators can choose between two eﬀort levels, high and low. We relax this assumption
in Appendix G, where we allow for multiple, but discreet eﬀort levels. Let qH represent the
probability of KG when an innovator decides to exert high eﬀort. If the innovator chooses to exert
low eﬀort, the innovator’s probability of a good project is given by qL. An innovator’s cost of high
eﬀort is ξH , whereas the cost of low eﬀort is equal to ξL. We assume qH > qL and ξH > ξL. Eﬀort
cannot be observed by the investor, and is therefore not contractible.
A summary of the timing stages of the model is presented in Figure 1.
Before we move on to discuss contract schemes, we present the ﬁrst-best case, i.e. the case when
we have no agency costs. The ﬁrst-best investment timing will serve as a benchmark for our mixed
hidden eﬀort and private information problem.
3.1. First best investment decisions: no hidden eﬀort or private information (the
benchmark case). Let V (X,Ki) denote the value of a project with innovator i’s investment
cost when there is no unobservable action and no asymmetric information. The investment project
is formulated as a real option: the project value is maximized by ﬁnding the optimal time to invest.
Let the function X∗(Ki) represent the value of future cash ﬂows that triggers investment. This
means that it is optimal to invest immediately when X > X∗(Ki). If X < X∗(Ki) the project value
is maximized by postponing the investment until X reaches the trigger X∗(Ki). It is well known
(shown in Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel (1985), and Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), among others) that the project value then is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. The value of innovator i’s investment project when there are no agency problems:
(2) V (X,Ki) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
X
X∗(Ki)
)β
(X∗(Ki)−Ki) for X < X∗(Ki)
X −Ki for X ≥ X∗(Ki),
where
(3) X∗(Ki) =
β
β − 1Ki,
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and
(4) β =
1
2
− μ/σ2 +
√
(μ/σ2 − 1
2
)2 + 2r/σ2 > 1.
A proof of Proposition 3.1 is given in Appendix A. Eq. (2) shows that if immediate investment
is optimal, the value of the project is equal to X − Ki. The term
(
X
X∗(Ki)
)β
in Eq. (2) can be
interpreted as a discount factor as it gives the present value of receiving one unit of money at the
expected future time when X reaches X∗(Ki). For the rest of the presentation we assume that
X is below the investment trigger for all values of the investment cost, Ki. This simpliﬁes the
presentation of the model without loss of generalization.
The value of the project in Proposition 3.1 is based on ex post information, i.e. given that the
parties observe the investment cost of project i, and under the assumption that innovator i knows
that his project will be ﬁnanced by the investor. Initially, the investor and the innovators do not
know whether their projects are of high or low quality. In order to increase the probability that at
least one of the innovators’ projects is of high quality, the investor can invite multiple innovators
to submit business proposals. However, this comes at a cost as the investor has to compensate
the innovators for their eﬀort costs of preparing proposals. In the ﬁrst-best case, the investor’s
optimization problem with respect to how many innovators, n, to invite to the contest is a trade-oﬀ
between these two considerations. We will assume that it is optimal for the innovators to exert
high eﬀort.3
In our model it is assumed that the investor has the bargaining power. Hence, in the ﬁrst best
case the investor obtains the entire value of the project the investor selects, and the innovators are
compensated only for their eﬀort costs. The investor optimally chooses to invest in one of the high
quality projects. Let pHn represent the probability that there is at least one innovator with a K
G-
type project, i.e., pHn = 1− (1− qH)n. The investor’s ex ante value of the investment opportunity,
as well as the optimal number of innovators to invite to submit investment proposals, are stated in
the following proposition.
3The innovators are assumed to have to exert at least ”low eﬀort” to submit a project proposal. Therefore, if low
eﬀort were the optimal choice there would be no moral hazard problem to discuss, and the investor’s optimization
problem would be equal to a pure private information problem.
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Proposition 3.2. For a given n, the investor’s ﬁrst best value of the contract is equal to
(5)
V PFB(X,n) = p
H
n
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)+ (1− pHn )
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β (
X∗(KB)−KB)− nξH .
The optimal number of innovators in the ﬁrst-best scenario can be expressed as
(6) n∗FB =
ln
⎛
⎝ ξH
− ln(1−qH)
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
(X∗(KG)−KG)−
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β
(X∗(KB)−KB)
]
⎞
⎠
ln(1− qH) .
The optimal number of innovators given by Eq. (6) is found by maximizing V PFB with respect to
n, as shown in Appendix B. Eq. (6) illustrates that the optimal number of innovators is a trade-oﬀ
between the eﬀort costs of the innovators, ξH , and the probability qH that an innovator has a high
quality project.
3.2. Setting with hidden eﬀort and private information. The investor oﬀers a contract to
n innovators. The contract is a function of the observable asset value, X, and the n innovators’
reports of their privately observed investment costs, Kˆ = [Kˆ1, Kˆ2, ..., Kˆn], where Kˆi is innovator
i’s report of his privately observed cost Ki, i = 1, ..., n.
Using results of Laﬀont and Tirole (1987) we organize the competition as a ”winner-takes-all”
contract: The innovator who is awarded the contract shares the value of the project with the
investor, whereas the competitors receive nothing. The proﬁt sharing between the investor and the
innovator who wins the contract takes place at the time of investment. If innovator i is awarded the
contract the reported project value at the investment time, X − Kˆi, is shared between innovator i
and the investor. Let si(X, Kˆ) be the compensation of innovator i, and X − Kˆi − si(X, Kˆ) be the
investor’s compensation. If innovator i’s report Kˆi deviates from the true value Ki, innovator i’s
value from the contract is equal to si(X, Kˆ)+Kˆi−Ki. The investment is made when X reaches the
trigger XI(Kˆi) if the winner, innovator i, reports Kˆi. In short, the winner is oﬀered the contract
{XI(Kˆi), si(X, Kˆ)}.
In our model we have only two possible values of each innovator i’s investment cost Ki, K
G
i
and KBi . This means that the innovator awarded the contract can choose between two contract
schemes, depending on whether the innovator reports a good or a bad project. As all innovators
with investment cost KG have identical projects, and all innovators with investment cost KB have
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identical projects, we drop the subscript i for innovator i in the notation below. We impose the
condition that the investor has to oﬀer the same menu of contracts for each agent. The two available
contracts are then denoted {XG, sG} and {XB , sB}, where XG ≡ XI(KG), sG ≡ si(XI(KG), Kˆ),
XB ≡ XI(KB), sB ≡ si(XI(KB), Kˆ).
The project that obtains ﬁnancing is selected randomly from the pool of projects with the highest
value. Thus, at the stage when each innovator’s private information is revealed, each innovator’s
probability of being awarded the contract when there is n competitors is represented by Y Gn if the
innovator announces a good project, or Y Bn if the innovator reports a bad project. The probability
Y Bn is given by the probability that none of the other n− 1 innovators reports KG,
(7) Y Bn =
1
n
(1− qH)n−1.
For innovators of KG-type, the probability of winning is equal to,
(8) Y Gn =
n−1∑
j=0
1
j + 1
⎛
⎝ n− 1
j
⎞
⎠ qjH(1− qH)n−1−j .
To simplify notation we deﬁne each innovator’s expected compensation, SG = Y GsG and SB =
Y BsB.
As each innovator ex ante has identical projects, the investor’s portfolio of projects equals the
investor’s expected values from each project multiplied by the number of innovators competing for
the contract, n,
(9)
V P (X,n) = n
[
qH
(
X
XG
)β
(Y Gn
(
XG −KG)− SG)+ (1− qH)
(
X
XB
)β (
Y Bn (X
B −KB)− SB)
]
.
For a ﬁxed n the investor maximizes her value V P (X,n) by ﬁnding optimal investment strategies,
XG and XB , and compensation functions, SG and SB. This optimization problem is solved in
Section 4. In Section 6 we solve the investor’s problem of ﬁnding the optimal number of innovators
to oﬀer the contract to.
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4. Optimal investment trigger and expected compensation of each innovator
To solve the optimization problem with respect to investment triggers and expected compensation
we follow the approach of Grenadier and Wang (2005). They have a similar real options set-up to
ours, except that in their paper there is only one agent who needs incentives to exert eﬀort and
reveal private information. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) (pp. 294-298) also present an agency
problem with one agent, in which moral hazard is followed by private information, but their model
is in discrete time. We introduce competition in the Grenadier and Wang type framework using
a similar approach to the private-value auctions described in Klemperer (1999) and Laﬀont and
Tirole (1987). Laﬀont and Tirole assume that each ﬁrm has private information about its future
cost at the contracting stage, whereas in our model there is no private information at that stage.
They formulate the principal’s maximization problem as a Vickrey auction, in which each bidder
simultaneously submits a bid, without seeing others’ bids. The contract is given to the bidder who
makes the best bid, and is priced according to the second-best bidder. In this auction truth telling
is a dominant strategy. Although we also apply a Vickrey auction in order to solve our agency
problem, it can be shown that the results do not depend on how the auction is organized (see
Klemperer (1999) section 4 and references therein).
In Eqs. (10)-(15) we formulate the main optimization problem of the investor with respect to
each innovator’s investment trigger and expected compensation. For a given n we maximize the
investor’s value with respect to each innovator’s project,
(10) max
XG,XB,SG,SB
qH
(
X
XG
)β (
Y Gn (X
G −KG)− SG)+(1− qH)
(
X
XB
)β (
Y Bn (X
B −KB)− SB) ,
subject to ex ante incentive compatibility and participation constraints, and ex post incentive
compatibility and participation constraints in Eqs. (11)-(15) below:
• Prior to exerting eﬀort the innovators do not know their respective investment costs. Each
innovator’s probability of developing a high quality project depends on his level of eﬀort.
The ex ante incentive compatibility constraint (hidden eﬀort/moral hazard) ensures that
each innovator chooses to exert high eﬀort instead of low eﬀort,
qH
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qH)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξH ≥ qL
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qL)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξL.
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The left-hand side of the equation represents an innovator’s value of the project if he exerts
high eﬀort, whereas the right-hand side states the value of low eﬀort. We rearrange the
expression as follows,
(11)
(
X
XG
)β
SG −
(
X
XB
)β
SB ≥ Δξ
Δq
,
where Δξ ≡ ξH − ξL and Δq ≡ qH − qL.
• The ex ante participation constraint makes sure that the innovators participate in the
competition, which means that the value of participating must be positive,
qH
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qH)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξH ≥ 0.
We reorganize the ex ante participation constraint,
(12)
(
X
XG
)β
SG +
1− qH
qH
(
X
XB
)β
SB ≥ ξH
qH
.
• The ex post incentive constraints are necessary to ensure that the innovators report their
true investment costs. If an innovator has a good project, his value of truthfully reporting
a low investment cost must be higher than his value from reporting a high investment cost,
(13)
(
X
XG
)β
SG ≥
(
X
XB
)β (
SB + Y Bn ΔK
)
,
where ΔK ≡ KB −KG > 0. The left-hand side of Eq. (13) represents the compensation of
reporting a true investment cost. It must be at least as valuable as the compensation of lying,
given by the right-hand side of Eq. (13), and therefore we deﬁne the left-hand side term as
value of private information, or informational rents. Note that the investor has three tools
at her disposal in order to reduce the value of an innovator’s private information. She can
increase XB , thereby delaying the investment in the bad project. This reduces the KG-type
innovator’s value of private information, as he would have to wait longer to realize his gain
from a bad project. Secondly, she can increase the number of competitors. This reduces the
value of private information through a reduced probability of being awarded the contract.
Thus, the more competitors, the lower value of exploiting the private information. Thirdly,
the investor can also reduce the compensation of an innovator reporting a bad project, SB .
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The private information constraint of an innovator with a bad project is given by,
(14)
(
X
XB
)β
SB ≥
(
X
XG
)β (
SG − Y Gn ΔK
)
.
• The ex post participation constraint requires that expected compensation for both types is
positive,
(15) SG ≥ 0, SB ≥ 0.
Thus, contracts are bounded by limited liability.
The optimization problem in Eqs. (10)-(15) can be simpliﬁed. In Proposition 4.1 the simplifying
results are summarized (and correspond to Propositions 2-5 in Grenadier and Wang (2005)).
Proposition 4.1. (i) The expected compensation of an innovator with investment cost KG,
SG, is strictly larger than zero.
(ii) The expected compensation of the KB-type innovator, SB, is equal to zero.
(iii) The ex post incentive constraint of a KB-type in Eq. (14) never binds.
(iv) At least one of the constraints in Eqs. (11), (12), and (13) always binds.
Proof. See Appendix C.1-C.2. The intuition of (i) is that to ensure truthtelling the compensa-
tion of the good type, SG, must be strictly larger than the compensation of the bad type, SB . In
(ii) the expected compensation of an innovator with investment cost KB equals zero since there
is no reason to give an innovator with the highest investment cost any informational rents. With
regard to (iii) the ex post incentive compatibility constraint of the bad type does not bind as long
as SG ≤ ( X
XG
)β
Y Gn ΔK, which we know from Eq. (13) must be true if the K
B-type innovator is to
accept SB = 0.
Proposition 4.1 leaves us with the following simpliﬁed optimization problem for the principal,
(16) max
SG,XG,XB
qH
(
X
XG
)β (
Y Gn (X
G −KG)− SG)+ (1− qH)
(
X
XB
)β
Y Bn
(
XB −KB) ,
subject to the private information constraint, the moral hazard constraint, and the participation
constraint for high eﬀort,
(17)
(
X
XG
)β
SG ≥ max
{(
X
XB
)β
Y Bn ΔK,
Δξ
Δq
,
ξH
qH
}
.
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The constraint in Eq. (17) replaces the three constraints in Eqs. (11), (12), and (13), since we
know from Proposition 4.1 (iv) that at least one of the constraints always binds. If the ﬁrst term
in the max-operator in Eq. (17) has the highest value of the three terms in the operator, the value
of an innovator’s compensation must be equal to his informational rents. If the second term is the
largest, the binding constraint is the investor’s cost of providing the innovators with incentives for
exerting high instead of low eﬀort. The third term is the investor’s cost of guaranteeing that each
innovator has a positive value from participating in the contest.
Below we present the solution to the optimization problem in Eqs. (16)-(17). First, we show
that for type KG projects, it is always optimal to follow the ﬁrst best investment strategy:
Proposition 4.2. If an innovator is of type KG the optimal investment trigger XG is equal to the
ﬁrst best trigger X∗(KG).
Proof. See Appendix C.2. Without incentive constraints it is optimal to invest at the ﬁrst-best
trigger and share the proﬁt between the investor and the winner of the contract. Hence, for a high
quality project agency problems do not imply a dead-weight loss in the contract. Agency problems
only have an impact on how the value of the investment project is shared between the investor and
the winner of the contract.
The properties of the optimal investment strategies for theKB-type innovator depend on which of
the constraints in Eq. (17) apply. Similarly to the model of Grenadier and Wang (2005), we identify
three regions of possible combinations of the constraints: In the private information region only the
private information constraint binds, and in the hidden eﬀort region either the ex ante incentive
constraint (the moral hazard constraint) or the ex ante participation constraint binds. In the joint
region the private information constraint and one of the eﬀort constraints bind simultaneously. The
regions are in particular sensitive to eﬀort costs, ξH , and number of competitors, n. The higher the
number of innovators the investor invites to compete for the contract, the more expensive it is for
the investor to give innovators incentives to provide eﬀort. This diminishes the regions in which
the private information problem apply.
4.1. The private information region. LetXPI be the optimal investment trigger of an innovator
with a low quality project when only the private information constraint binds. The ﬁrst-order
condition of Eq. (16) with respect to XB results in the following optimal investment trigger for
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the private information region,
(18) XPI =
β
β − 1
(
KB +
qH
1− qHΔK
)
.
The trigger XPI is strictly higher than the ﬁrst-best trigger X∗(KB). This means that the invest-
ment is delayed compared to ﬁrst-best investment timing. The result is equivalent to the result
in Grenadier and Wang (2005) that private information leads to under-investment. When private
information is the binding constraint, Eq. (17) requires that the expected compensation for each
KG-type investor is given by
(19)
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
SG =
(
X
XPI
)β
Y Bn ΔK.
The expected compensation in Eq. (19) represents each innovators’s informational rents. The value
of private information can be decomposed into the value of lying ΔK – the value of receiving KB
and paying the lower true investment cost KG – adjusted by the discount factor,
(
X
XPI
)β
, and the
probability of winning the contract given that the innovator announces that he has a bad quality
project, Y Bn . Eq. (19) illustrates why it is optimal to to delay the investment compared to a ﬁrst
best policy: A delayed investment reduces the value of the discount factor on the right-hand side
of Eq. (19), which again reduces informational rents.
4.2. The hidden eﬀort region. When one of the eﬀort constraints binds, and the private infor-
mation constraint does not, we let XHE denote optimal investment trigger. Again, we ﬁnd the
optimal trigger by maximizing Eq. (16) with respect to XB , which gives
(20) XHE =
β
β − 1K
B.
In this scenario there is no investment delay compared to the ﬁrst-best investment strategy as the
optimal investment trigger is equal to the ﬁrst best trigger, i.e., XHE = X∗(KB). Let C(ξH , qH) ≡
max
{
Δξ
Δq ,
ξH
qH
}
. The constraint in Eq. (17) requires that in the hidden eﬀort region the expected
compensation of an innovator with a good project is
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
SG = C(ξH , qH).
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Hence, in the hidden eﬀort region an innovator’s expected compensation is equal to the maximum
of
• the eﬀort cost adjusted by the probability of being a high quality innovator, ξH/qH , and
• the extra compensation an innovator requires in order to choose high eﬀort instead of low
eﬀort divided by the increase in the probability of managing a high quality project from qL
to qH , Δξ/Δq ≡ (ξH − ξL)/(qH − qL).
4.3. The joint region. When both the private information constraint and one of the eﬀort con-
straints in Eq. (17) bind simultaneously, the optimal investment trigger requires that the in-
vestor’s cost of private information and hidden eﬀort must be equal to each other, i.e., we need(
X
XB
)β
Y Bn ΔK = C(ξH , qH). In other words, the informational rent
(
X
XJ
)β
Y Bn ΔK is equal to the
cost of providing an investor with incentives for high eﬀort, C(ξH , qH). The optimal investment
trigger, denoted XJ , is then given by
(21) XJ =
(
Y Bn ΔK
C(ξH , qH)
) 1
β
X.
Since both constraints bind simultaneously, we derive from Eq. (17) that the expected compen-
sation of an innovator with a good project is equal to
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
SG =
(
X
XJ
)β
Y Bn ΔK = C(ξH , qH).
4.4. Summary of ﬁndings with respect to investment timing and compensation. Our
ﬁndings with respect to regions, investment triggers and innovators’ values are summarized in
Proposition 4.3:
Proposition 4.3. The optimal investment trigger of a project with investment cost equal to KB,
is given by
(22) XB∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β
β−1
(
KB + qH1−qHΔK
)
for the private information region(
Y Bn ΔK
C(ξH ,qH)
) 1
β
X for the joint region
β
β−1K
B for hidden eﬀort region
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The expected compensation for an innovator with low investment cost, KG, is given by
(23)
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
SG∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
X
XPI
)β
Y Bn ΔK for the private information region(
X
XJ
)β
Y Bn ΔK = C(ξH , qH) for the joint region
C(ξH , qH) for the hidden eﬀort region
The diﬀerent regions can be identiﬁed through evaluation of Eq. (17), employing Eqs. (22) and
(23):
Private information region:max
{
Δξ
Δq
,
ξH
qH
}
≤
(
X
XPI
)β
Y Bn ΔK
(24)
Joint region:
(
X
XPI
)β
Y Bn ΔK ≤ max
{
Δξ
Δq
,
ξH
qH
}
≤
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β
Y Bn ΔK(25)
Hidden eﬀort region:
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β
Y Bn ΔK ≤ max
{
Δξ
Δq
,
ξH
qH
}
≤
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
Y Gn ΔK(26)
The expected compensation for each innovator in Eq. (23) is increasing and convex (recall that
β > 1) in the underlying asset value X when private information is the dominating agency problem.
When the moral hazard problem dominates, each innovator’s value is independent of the X.
In the joint region in Eq. (22) the investment policy XB∗ = XJ depends explicitly on the number
of innovators n: As n increases the trigger is pushed toward the ﬁrst-best trigger for an innovator
with a KB-type project. To show this more explicitly, we rearrange the optimal investment trigger
for the joint region. Rearranging the expression of the optimal investment trigger, XJ = XJ(n),
in (21) leads to
(27) XJ (n) =
β
β − 1
(
KB + λ1
qH
1− qHΔK
)
,
where
(28) λ1 =
(
XJ(n)−X∗(KB)) β − 1
β
1− qH
qH
1
ΔK
,
for 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1. For decreases in n or ξH , λ1 approaches 1 and this increases the optimal investment
trigger, XJ(n), until it reaches the investment trigger when private information is the only binding
constraint, XPI . Conversely, increases in n or ξH implies that λ1 approaches 0, and the investment
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trigger approaches ﬁrst-best. Thus the investment ineﬃciency caused by private information is
mitigated by moral hazard, as in Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
Our main contribution is to study the eﬀects of competition, and we ﬁnd that an increase in
competition is a ﬁrst-order factor in overcoming investment ineﬃciencies due to informational
problems.4
Although Eq. (22) shows that only in the joint region the optimal investment trigger explicitly
depends on n, the optimal investment trigger approaches the ﬁrst-best trigger X∗(KB) as the
number of n increases. The reason is that an increase in n reduces both the size of the private
information region and the joint region and increases the size of hidden eﬀort region. Hence, we
conclude that increased competition speeds up innovation, as illustrated in Figure 2. Observe that
as the number of innovators increases from one to four the optimal investment trigger approaches
the ﬁrst-best trigger5. We formalize the result in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4. The size of private information region and the joint region are decreasing in
n. This implies that as n increases the optimal investment trigger approaches the ﬁrst-best policy
X∗(KB).
Proof. From the regions given by Eqs. (24)-(26) we observe that if the probability that a low
quality project is awarded the contract, Y Bn , decreases, the hidden eﬀort region increases, whereas
the two other regions decreases. As Y Bn is decreasing in n, we attain the result in Proposition 4.4.
The result in Proposition 4.4 predicts that when suﬃciently many innovators compete for VC
ﬁnancing, or for winning a prize in an innovation contest, private information does not lead to
serious ineﬃciency problems.
Most of the extant literature on VC ﬁnancial contracts focuses on agency problems and risk
sharing, and not on competition. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2004) empirically study contracts in ven-
ture ﬁnancing. They conclude that agency problems such as moral hazard and private information
are more important to contract design than risk sharing concerns. Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011)
draw similar conclusions for experienced VCs. In our paper we show the nature of agency problems
changes in presence of competition among entrepreneurs in capital markets. Our model predicts
4If we relax the assumption that each innovator only observes his own investment cost and instead allow innovators
to have information about each other’s investment costs, it would be easier to reduce the informational rents to zero,
see Cre´mer and McLean (1988).
5Parameter values of numerical illustrations are given in Table 1.
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that private information problems are reduced as competition for project ﬁnancing is intensiﬁed,
whereas costs of moral hazard become more important.
5. The optimal sharing rule for fixed n
Recall that the compensation function SG represents the expected compensation of each innovator
with a high quality project, SG = Y GsG, where sG is the compensation of the innovator awarded
the contract. In Section 5.1 we evaluate the winner’s compensation sG and verify that this is indeed
an optimal contract for a given n. Moreover, in Section 5.2 we discuss properties of the sharing
rule between the innovator awarded the contract and the investor.
5.1. The compensation of the innovator awarded the contract. To maximize the investor’s
value the investor selects a winner from the pool of innovators with the lowest investment cost. As
the innovators in this pool are identical, the winner is picked randomly within the pool. Only the
winner of the contract obtains a compensation strictly larger than zero, sG. The other innovators’
compensations are equal to zero. Evaluation of the relationship SG = Y GsG and Eq. (23) leads to
the following expression of the optimal compensation of the innovator awarded the contract.
Proposition 5.1. The optimal compensation of the winner of the contract is given by
(29) sG∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
X∗(KG)
XPI
)β Y Bn
Y Gn
ΔK for the private information region(
X∗(KG)
XJ
)β
Y Bn
Y Gn
ΔK =
(
X∗(KG)
X
)β
C(ξH ,qH)
Y Gn
for the joint region(
X∗(KG)
X
)β C(ξH ,qH)
Y Gn
for the hidden eﬀort region
In Appendix E we verify that Eq. (29) is an optimal compensation function. In the private
information region the winner’s compensation, sG∗, linearly depends on the fraction Y Bn /Y Gn , which
decreases in the number of innovators n. This means that sG∗ decreases in n. The intuition for the
result is that the more competitors there are, the less incentive there is for an innovator to misreport
his type. In the joint region and the hidden eﬀort region the compensation function increases in n.
The explanation is that the investor has to compensate each innovator for his eﬀort costs adjusted
for the probability of winning the contract. The eﬀect of n on sG∗ is illustrated in Figure 3. The
curves represent the optimal compensation as a function of the cost of high eﬀort, ξH , for the cases
in which the number of competitors, n, is given by one to four, respectively. When the compensation
is independent of ξH only the private information constraint is binding. The curves in Figure 3
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illustrate that the value of private information decreases in n. The compensation increases linearly
in ξH in the intervals where the hidden eﬀort constraint binds. Note that the more competitors the
winner has, the steeper is his compensation as a function of ξH . The reason is that the principal
ex ante has to give incentives to all the innovators to exert costly eﬀort. Thus, Figure 3 illustrates
the trade-oﬀ the investor faces when she is optimizing over the optimal number of innovators: An
increase in the number of competitors reduces the costs of private information, but increases the
costs of compensating innovators for hidden eﬀort.
5.2. Properties of proﬁt sharing between the investor and the innovator awarded the
contract. We measure the contract winner’s share of the project value as the compensation,(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
sG∗ relative to the value of a high quality investment option, V (X,KG). The value
for the innovator awarded the contract can be derived from Eqs. (23) and (29),
(30)
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
sG∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
X
XPI
)β Y Bn
Y Gn
ΔK for the private information region(
X
XJ
)β Y Bn
Y Gn
XJΔK = C(ξH ,qH)
Y Gn
for the joint region
C(ξH ,qH)
Y Gn
for the hidden eﬀort region
Note that we have formulated the option to invest in a project, V (X, ·), analogously to a ﬁnancial
call option, in which the value of future stochastic cash ﬂows is replaced by the spot value of a
ﬁnancial asset, and the investment cost represents a contracted ﬁxed strike price. It is well known
that the value of a call option is increasing and convex in the underlying asset value, in our model
denoted by X. Moreover, the value of the option increases as a function of volatility σ. Thus,
instead we focus on the eﬀects of X and σ on proﬁt sharing between the contract winner and the
investor.
We start by discussing eﬀects of changes in the present value of future cash ﬂows from the project.
Since both the ﬁrst and second derivatives of Eqs. (2) and (30) in the private information region
and the joint region are positive for β > 1, the get the following result:
Proposition 5.2. The contract winner’s compensation, sG∗, is increasing and convex in X in the
private information region and the joint region. In the hidden eﬀort region the contract winner’s
compensation is independent of X.
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Figure 4 illustrates the contract winner’s share relative to the total value of the investment
project,
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
sG∗/V (X,KG) as a function of X. For low values of X the contract winner’s
share is high as the investment option is far ”out-of-the-money”, and thus the value of the in-
vestment option is low compared to the eﬀort cost. This result is consistent with Bengtsson and
Sensoy (2011), who ﬁnd that (experienced) investors require less downside protection. On the other
hand, the investor receives most of the upside potential of the project value: As X increases in the
hidden eﬀort region, the contract winner’s share decreases as a function of X. The reason is that
the compensation for the contract winner is independent of X in the hidden eﬀort region, whereas
the value of the investment project, V (X,KG), increases in X.
For XG ≤ X < XPI the contract winner’s share is increasing in X when n = 1, as shown in
Figure 4. This reﬂects the fact that the informational rents the investor has to pay to the innovator
in order to prevent him from lying increases more in X than the underlying investment project
V (X,KG) does in this interval: The value of the total project is linear in X as V (X,KG) = X−KG
and the contract winner’s value is convex in X for the private information region as shown in Eq.
(30). When X ≥ XPI the innovator’s maximum value of private information, ΔK Y Bn
Y Gn
, is reached.
Hence, in this interval the investor obtains the full upside potential of the investment project. This
explains the decreasing proﬁt share in Figure 4 for X ≥ XPI .
Note also that, analogously to the values illustrated in Figure 3, the contract winner’s share
increases in n in the hidden eﬀort region, and decreases in n in the private information region.
Moreover, the private information region is decreasing in n.
An increase in the volatility of future cash ﬂows, σ, has ambiguous eﬀects on the values for the
parties. On one hand, it enlarges the investment policy ineﬃciency through an increase in the
investment trigger XPI . On the other hand, we know that a higher volatility implies a higher
value of the investment option. Figure 5 illustrates the contract winner’s relative share of the
investment values as a function of σ. In the private information region for n = 1 the curve is
hump-shaped because of two opposing eﬀects: For small values of σ the convexity in the value of
private information dominates, which increases the innovator’s share. For larger values of σ the
under-investment eﬀect dominates: a higher volatility leads to an increase in the investment trigger
XPI , which reduces the value of private information. In the hidden eﬀort region, the contract
winner’s value of the compensation is relatively insensitive to σ, whereas the value of investment
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option increases. As we know that the value of an investment option increases in σ, this result too
illustrates that the investor obtains almost all the upside value of the option. Also consistently with
the previous result in Figure 3, Figure 5 illustrates that in the hidden eﬀort region, the contract
winner’s share increases in n.
As the eﬀort cost does not bind in the private information region, the winner’s share is indepen-
dent of ξH here. Figure 6 shows that as ξH becomes higher, the hidden eﬀort cost starts to bind,
the contract winner’s share increases. The increase is larger the higher the number of competitors
is. Moreover, as n increases the value of private information is reduced, and therefore both the
contract winner’s share and the private information region decreases in n.
6. Optimal number of innovators
So far we have optimized the investor’s value with respect to investment triggers and compen-
sation of the innovators. In this section, we let the investor optimize his value with respect to the
number of innovators invited to submit project proposals.
For optimal choices of the decision variables, XG,XB , SG, SB , the investor’s value in Eq. (9) is
maximized with respect to n as shown in the following optimization problem,
(31)
max
n
n
[
qH
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
Y Gn (X
∗(KG)−KG)− SG∗)+ (1− qH)
(
X
XB∗
)β
Y Bn (X
B∗ −KB)
]
.
Recall that pHn = 1 − (1 − qH)n is the probability that the winner of the contract is KG-type.
Alternatively, we can formulate the probability as pHn = nqHY
G
n , i.e. the probability that there is a
good innovator in the pool of innovators is equal to the number of innovators times each innovator’s
probability that he has a good project, and times each innovator’s probability of winning the
contract given that he has a good project. Moreover, we have that 1− pHn = n(1− qH)Y Bn . Thus,
we can rewrite the optimization problem in Eq. (31) as
(32) max
n
= pHn
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG − sG∗)+ (1− pHn )
(
X
XB∗
)β (
XB∗ −KB) .
We analyze the optimization problem separately for each region.
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In the private information region, evaluation of sG∗ in (32) using Eqs. (23) and (29) leads to the
following expression for the investor’s value,
(33)
V PPI(n) = p
H
n
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)+ (1− pHn )
(
X
XPI
)β (
XPI −KB − qH
1− qHΔK
)
.
Observe that the probability that the winner is type KG, pHn , increases in n. As the ﬁrst term
in Eq. (33) is larger than the second term, the value V PPI(n) increases in n for all n in the region.
Intuitively, as long as the hidden eﬀort constraint does not bind, the investor’s value increases in
the number of competitors.
Evaluation of the investor’s value in the joint region leads to
(34)
V PJ (n) = p
H
n
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)+ (1− pHn )
(
X
XJ(n)
)β (
XJ(n)−KB − qH
1− qHΔK
)
.
In this region a higher number of innovators, n, increases the probability of the winner being an
KG-type and pushes the optimal investment trigger of a winner of KB-type towards his ﬁrst-best
trigger. Both factors lead to a higher value for the investor. On the other hand, a higher n implies
that the winner’s compensation must be higher to motivate all innovators to exert high eﬀort,
which decreases the investor’s value. In sum,
∂V PJ (n)
∂n > 0 for all n in the region. A proof is given
in Appendix F.
Our results so far are summed up in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1. The investor chooses n so that ﬁrst-best investment triggers are reached.
This means that when the investor can freely choose the optimal number of innovators, the
private information constraint will not be a binding constraint in the contract, and there is no
investment ineﬃciency. Consequently, the private information and joint regions cease to exist, and
only the hidden eﬀort region remains relevant. Note also that the contract is renegotiation proof
with respect to investment policy, as a contracted ﬁrst best investment policy implies that the
policy will be optimal after the investor has selected a contract winner. Thus when the investor is
allowed to choose optimal n, there is no need to assume that the investor has to commit fully to
the proposed contract.
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In our model we have assumed that each innovator can choose only between two eﬀort levels.
In Appendix G we show that Proposition 6.1 is valid also for the case in which each innovator can
choose among multiple eﬀort levels, where a higher eﬀort level corresponds to a higher eﬀort cost
and a higher probability of drawing a good project.
The optimal number of competitors is then found in the hidden eﬀort region, where the value to
the investor, V PHE , is equal to
(35)
V PHE(n) = p
H
n
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)
+(1− pHn )
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β (
X∗(KB)−KB)− nqH max{ΔξΔq , ξHqH
}
.
In this region private information is not a binding constraint, and the optimal n is found based
on the following trade-oﬀ: The probability that the winner of the contract is a KG-type agent
increases in n, which leads to a higher value for the investor. On the other hand, a larger n implies
a higher compensation for the winner, as the investor has to give all the innovators incentives to
exert high eﬀort. This lowers the value to the investor.
Note that the trade-oﬀ is consistent with the empirical results in Boudreau et al. (2011). They
ﬁnd that for less uncertain problems, the eﬀort eﬀect is the largest, implying that for these problems
fewer innovators are invited to compete for the prize of the contest. For more uncertain problems,
the dominating eﬀect is to invite many innovators to compete for the prize to increase the probability
that one of the innovators come up with a good solution for the problem.
If ξHqH ≥
Δξ
Δq in Eq. (35) the ex ante participation constraint binds, and not the ex ante incentive
constraint, and consequently the investor’s value is equal to her value in the ﬁrst-best case in Eq.
(5). Intuitively, both in the ﬁrst-best case and in the situation in which eﬀort is unobservable
the investor needs to compensate the innovators for their costs of submitting business proposals.
The investor’s value is lower than in a ﬁrst best situation only when the costs of providing each
innovator with incentives for high eﬀort is larger than the participation costs.
We simplify the optimization problem with respect to n by allowing n to be continuous. The
following proposition gives a closed-form solution for the optimal number of innovators and is
derived by maximizing the investor’s value in Eq. (35) with respect to n.
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Proposition 6.2. For all n satisﬁed by the hidden eﬀort region in equation (26), the optimal
number of innovators, n∗, is equal to
(36) n∗ =
ln
⎛
⎝ qHC(ξH ,qH)
− ln(1−qH )
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
(X∗(KG)−KG)−
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β
(X∗(KB)−KB)
]
⎞
⎠
ln(1− qH) .
Eq. (36) is well deﬁned for parameter values such that the fraction in the logarithmic expression
in the nominator gives values between 0 and 1. In Appendix H we discuss the optimality conditions
when we restrict n be discrete and show that Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 are still valid when we ensure
that there exist at least one value of n in the hidden eﬀort region.
Figure 7 illustrates the investor’s project value as a function of the number of innovators, n.
The upper curve represents the project value in the ﬁrst-best case of no agency problems, whereas
the lower curve is the value for the investor given a contract written under the assumption of full
commitment. In this numerical example, it is optimal to choose approximately ﬁve innovators
both in the ﬁrst best case and when we have agency problems. In general, the optimal number of
innovators is higher in the ﬁrst best case than in the case in which we have a binding moral hazard
constraint, as the eﬀort cost per innovator is given by ΔξΔq >
ξH
qH
.
Initially, we assumed that it is optimal for the investor to provide the innovators with incentives
for exerting high eﬀort. Thus, we need to verify numerically that high eﬀort is the optimal choice,
i.e., we need to make sure that the following inequality holds:
(37)
V PHE(n
∗) ≥ max
n
{
pLn
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)+ (1− pLn)
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β (
X∗(KB)−KB)− nξL
}
,
where pLn ≡ 1−(1−qL)n. The right-hand side of Eq. (37) is the value of the investor’s contract if she
had given all the innovators incentives for low eﬀort. We can verify this inequality in our numerical
example. Given the parameter values in Table 1 we ﬁnd that n∗ = 4.8 and V PHE(n
∗) = 66.24. If the
investor instead gives the innovators incentives for low eﬀort the value of the investor’s project is a
little lower, 65.91. Hence, in this example the diﬀerence in value between high eﬀort and low eﬀort
is not large. However, the optimal number of innovators is much higher in the low eﬀort case, 26.9.
The reason is that each innovator’s cost of exerting low eﬀort, ξL = 0.25, is signiﬁcantly smaller
than the cost of exerting high eﬀort, ξH = 1.3. Moreover, the probability that an innovator draws
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a high quality project is also smaller given low eﬀort, qL = 0.1, whereas qH = 0.45. Note that if
ξL = 0 there is no cost of inviting one more innovator to participate in the contest, and in that
case it is therefore optimal to let the number of competitors go to inﬁnity.
7. Properties of the contract
The optimal number of innovators will of course vary depending on types of projects, markets
and industries. In this section we study the impact of proﬁtability, volatility, and eﬀort costs on
the optimal number of innovators, n∗. In addition we study the proﬁt sharing characteristics of the
optimal contract. When we study sharing properties we implicitly assume that the winning project
is a high quality project with investment cost KG. The situation in which the contract winner has
a project of low quality is trivial when it comes to sharing properties, as the compensation of the
contract winner, sB∗, is equal to zero.
We start by discussing eﬀects from changes in the value of future cash ﬂows from the project,
X.
Proposition 7.1. An increase in X,
(i) leads to a higher n∗,
(ii) increases the value to the investor, V PHE(n
∗),
(iii) increases the contract winner’s compensation,
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
sG∗ = C(ξH ,qH)
Y G
n∗
,
(iv) reduces the contract winner’s proﬁt share, C(ξH ,qH)
Y G
n∗
1
V (X,KG)
.
Proof: See Appendix I.1
The intuition for the result in Proposition 7.1 (i) is as follows. A higher value of X implies that
both a high quality and a low quality project increase in value. However, the increase is larger for
the high quality project than the low quality project, which means that the investor will have an
incentive to invite more innovators to compete for the contract, as this increases the probability
that a least of the projects will be of high quality.
Proposition 7.1 (i) and (ii) state that the value functions for both the investor and the innovator
increase in X, as is the case for the total value of the investment option. However, the innovator’s
value is relatively insensitive to increases in X since his value of the compensation increases only
through the denominator of his value function C(ξH , qH)/Y
G
n∗ . As n
∗ increases in X the probability
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that any good innovator wins the contract, Y Gn∗ , is reduced. This lower probability of winning
must be compensated by increasing the compensation. The result in Proposition 7.1 (iv) implies
that the investor’s value increases more than the value for the innovator in X. The reason is
that the innovators have no negotiation power in our model, and each innovator’s expected value
of participating in the contest therefore has an upper boundary equal to the cost of giving them
incentives to choose high eﬀort. In other words, the investor obtains most of the upside value of
the investment option.
Proposition 7.2. An increase in the volatility σ,
(i) reduces the optimal number of innovators, n∗, and
(ii) increases the value to the investor, V PHE(n
∗).
(iii) is independent of each good innovator’s value of participating in the contest, C(ξH , qH),
decreases the winning innovator’s compensation, C(ξH ,qH)
Y G
n∗
.
Proof: Appendix I.2. The result in Proposition 7.2 (i) is perhaps counterintuitive as we know
that the value of the investment option in equation (2) increases in volatility. Thus, one could be
led to believe that it is proﬁtable to invite more innovators to compete for the contract, in order to
ensure that there is at least one good project in the pool of potential investment projects. However,
it turns out that it is actually optimal to decrease the number of innovators. The explanation is that
the increase in the value of an investment option is concave in σ. This means that the diﬀerence
between the value of a good project and the value of a bad project decreases in σ. Consequently,
n∗ is reduced for higher σ.
The value of the investor’s investment option, V PHE(n
∗), is, as expected for the value of an
investment option, increasing in σ. More surprisingly, in the hidden eﬀort region the innovator is
not compensated for higher volatility. On the contrary, Proposition 7.2 (iii) states that the contract
winner’s compensation decreases in σ. This result follows from in Proposition 7.2 (i): the number
of competitors is reduced because of higher volatility. As each innovator’s probability of winning
the contest is higher, the winner’s compensation is lower while still satisfying each innovator’s ex
ante participation and incentive constraints.
The size of a VC portfolio, or the number of innovators invited to compete for a contract, highly
depends on each innovator’s probability of drawing a high quality project, qH , and each innovator’s
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cost of exerting high eﬀort, ξH . These two parameters correspond to the trade-oﬀ when it comes
to the choice of n in innovation contest models, as described in Terwiesh and Xu (2008) and
Boudreau et al. (2011): the trade-oﬀ between inviting many innovators to a contest as it increases
the probability that one project is good, and the cost of eﬀort if too many innovators are invited.
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003, 2004) and Bernile et al. (2007) show that the more entrepreneurs
there are in a VC portfolio, the poorer is the quality of the venture capitalist’s advice (eﬀort) to
each entrepreneur.
Proposition 7.3. An increase in the probability of a high quality project, qH , leads to
(i) a reduction in n∗,
(ii) an increase in the investor’s value, V PHE(n
∗),
(iii) a reduction in the contract winner’s compensation, C(ξH ,qH)
Y G
n∗
.
Proof: Appendix I.3. When the probability that each innovator draws a high quality project
increases, the probability that at least one of n innovators submits a business proposal for a high
quality project increases as well. Therefore the investor will have incentives to invite fewer inno-
vators to compete for the contract, as stated in Proposition 7.3 (i). Thus, the investor can save
costs by inviting fewer innovators, as is the result in Proposition 7.3 (ii). The interpretation of
Proposition 7.3 (iii) is that when qH increases, it is suﬃcient to pay the innovator awarded the
contract less.
A higher eﬀort cost ξH increases the region in which hidden eﬀort binds, as can be seen from
Eq. (17). Since ξH is a cost incurred by the innovators participating in the contest, the expected
value from participating must cover these costs, as formulated in (11) and (12). Thus, we expect
n∗ to decrease in ξH . Furthermore, we expect the investor’s value to decrease in ξH as the payment
to the contract winner would have to increase to cover his higher eﬀort cost, and the contract
winner’s compensation to increase correspondingly. These conjunctures are indeed conﬁrmed in
the following proposition, and proved in Appendix I.4.
Proposition 7.4. An increase in the cost of high eﬀort, ξH , leads to
(i) a reduction in n∗,
(ii) a decrease in the investor’s value, V PHE(n
∗),
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(iii) an increase in the winning innovator’s compensation, C(ξH ,qH)
Y G
n∗
.
Proposition 7.4 (ii) and (iii) tell us that ξH is important for proﬁt sharing between the investor
and the innovator awarded the contract: the higher the cost of eﬀort, the larger is the winning
innovator’s share of the value of the investment option.
8. Conclusion
We have presented an investment problem involving both moral hazard and private information
in a real options framework where one of the choice variables is when to invest. In our screening
model the investor designs the contract so that the innovators have an incentive to truthfully
reveal their information and provide high eﬀort. In order to elicit information revelation expensive
investments are delayed when the investor contracts only with one innovator. Competition among
innovators alters this result dramatically: we show that when the investor can choose the number
of innovators freely, investment options are exercised so that ﬁrst best investment trigger is always
achieved. Also as a result of competition among innovators, all the informational rents are dissipated
and the winner of the competition is only compensated for the eﬀort costs. Thus the investor is
able to capture the upside potential of the investments. While we achieve these results in a simple
model where innovators have only two levels of eﬀort and there are only two kinds of projects, the
eﬀects of competition carry over to more complex models. Competition will erode the value to wait
and the exercise decision will be closer to the ﬁrst best, even if it can’t be exactly achieved.
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Appendix A. Value of investment project in first best case
As shown by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), among many others, the ordinary diﬀerential equation
of the project value V (X, ·) can be formulated as
(38)
1
2
σ2X2VXX + μXVX − rV = 0,
where VX and VXX are the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the value function V (X,Ki) with respect
to X. Boundary conditions of the value are
(39) V (X∗(Ki),Ki) = X∗(Ki)−Ki,
(40) VX(X
∗(Ki),Ki) = 1,
(41) V (0,Ki) = 0.
The boundary condition in Eq. (39) tells us that at the investment trigger, X∗(Ki), the project
value must be equal to the payoﬀ from the project when investment takes place. Eq. (40) is an
optimality condition, ensuring that the investment trigger X∗(Ki) is determined so as to maximize
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the value of the investment option. We assume that zero is an absorbing barrier for X, as reﬂected
by the boundary condition in Eq. (41). The solution of the diﬀerential equation in Eq. (38),
subject to the boundary conditions in Eqs. (39)-(41), is given in Proposition 3.1.
Appendix B. First best solution of n
First-order diﬀerentiation of Eq. (5) with respect to n leads to
(42)
dV (X)
dn
= − ln(1−qH)(1−qH)n
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)− ( X
X∗(KB)
)β (
X∗(KB)−KB)
]
−ξH .
We ﬁnd the expression of n∗FB in Eq. (6) by setting the ﬁrst-order diﬀerentiation above equal to 0
and solve for n.
Appendix C. Deriving the optimal contract
C.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1 (i). The following inequalities show that the expected compen-
sation of innovators with good projects must be strictly positive:
(43)
(
X
XG
)β
SG ≥
(
X
XB
)β (
SB + Y Bn ΔK
) ≥ ( X
XB
)β
Y Bn ΔK > 0,
for X > 0. The ﬁrst inequality in Eq. (43) follows from the ex post incentive constraint of an
innovator with a high quality project in Eq. (13). The second inequality follows from the limited
liability condition in Eq. (15).
C.2. Optimal investment triggers and expected compensation. We deﬁne a Lagrangian
function in order to solve the optimization problem in Eqs. (10)-(15),
(44)
L =
(
X
XG
)β (
Y Gn (X
G −KG)− SG)+ 1−qHqH ( XXB )β (Y Bn (XB −KB)− SB)
+λ1
[(
X
XG
)β
SG − ( X
XB
)β (
SB + Y Bn ΔK
)]
+λ2
[(
X
XB
)β
SB − ( X
XG
)β (
SG − Y Gn ΔK
)]
+λ3
[(
X
XG
)β
SG − ( X
XB
)β
SB − ΔξΔq
]
+λ4
[(
X
XG
)β
SG + 1−qHqH
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξHqH
]
+λ5S
B.
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to SG gives
(45) λ1 − λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = 1.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to SB is equal to
(46)
(
X
XB
)β [
−λ1 + λ2 − λ3 − 1− qH
qH
(λ4 + 1)
]
+ λ5 = 0.
We use the relationship in Eq. (45) to simplify the condition in Eq. (46), which gives
(
X
XB
)β (
λ4
1
qH
+ 1qH
)
+
λ5 = 0. We conjecture for now that S
B = 0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the investment triggers XG and XB are found to be
equal to
(47) XG =
β
β − 1
(
KG − λ2ΔK
)
,
and
(48) XB =
β
β − 1
(
KB + λ1
qH
1− qHΔK
)
.
It can be shown that the ex post incentive compatibility constraint for innovators of type KB
never binds (to be veriﬁed later), i.e., that λ2 = 0 (which for the ex post incentive compatibility
constraint to hold means that we need to have SG ≤ Y Gn ΔK). Thus, the investment trigger for
good projects, XG, is equal to the ﬁrst best trigger.
The investment trigger for bad projects will deviate from ﬁrst best trigger. Note that with
λ2 = 0, the relationship in Eq. (45) will be equal to λ1 + λ3 + λ4 = 1. This means that at
least of the incentive compatibility constraints, private information or hidden eﬀort, or the ex ante
participation constraint, will always bind.
C.3. Private information. If the ex ante incentive and participation constraints do not bind we
have λ1 = 1. The optimal investment trigger for the agent of type B will be equal to
XPI =
β
β − 1
(
KB +
qH
1− qHΔK
)
.
C.4. Hidden eﬀort. When the private information constraint does not bind, i.e., when one of the
eﬀort constraints binds, we have λ1 = 0. Thus, the investment trigger X
B is in this region equal
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to the ﬁrst-best investment trigger,
XHE = X∗(KB) =
β
β − 1K
B.
C.5. Both the private information and on of the hidden eﬀort restrictions bind. The
combined ﬁrst-order conditions of the Lagrangian function with respect to λ1 and max{λ3, λ4}
yield
XJ =
(
1
max{ΔξΔq , ξHqH }
Y Bn ΔK
) 1
β
X.
Consistency with the expression of XB in Eq. (48) requires that
(49) λ1 =
(
XJ −X∗(KB)) β − 1
β
1− qH
qH
1
ΔK
.
Appendix D. Parameter values for numerical illustrations
The parameter values used in the base case of the numerical illustrations are presented in Table
1.
Appendix E. Verifying that sG∗ and sB∗ are optimal compensations
Deﬁne the value of an innovator’s participation in the competition as V G and V B , depending
on whether the innovator has developed a high or a low quality project. Using this more general
function for the value of each innovator, the Lagrange formulation of the investor’s optimization
problem is given by
(50)
L¯ =
(
X
XG
)β
Y Gn (X
G −KG)− V G + 1−qHqH
((
X
XB
)β
Y Bn (X
B −KB)− V B
)
+λ1
[
V G −
(
V B +
(
X
XB
)β
Y Bn ΔK
)]
+λ2
[
V B −
(
V G − ( X
XG
)β
Y Gn ΔK
)]
+λ3
[
V G − V B − ΔξΔq
]
+λ4
[
V G + 1−qHqH
(
V B − ξHqH
)]
+λ5V
B.
Maximizing the Lagrange function with respect to XG, XB , V G, and V B leads to identical invest-
ment triggers in Eq. (22). This implies that V G = Y Gn s
G, and we conclude that sG∗ in Eq. (29)
and sB∗ = 0 are optimal compensation functions.
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Appendix F. Effect on the value of the investor when n increases in the private
information and the joint regions
The probability that the investor will contract with a good innovator, pHn = 1 − (1 − qH)n,
increases in n, as
(51)
∂pHn
∂n
= −(1− qH)n ln(1− qH) ≥ 0.
In the private information region the eﬀect on the investor’s value in Eq. (33) of a small increase
in n is given by
(52)
∂V PPI(n)
∂n
=
∂pHn
∂n
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)− ( X
XPI
)β (
XPI −KB − qH
1− qHΔK
)]
≥ 0.
In the joint region the investment trigger of a low quality project, XJ (n), depends on n. However,
note that the investor’s value function, V PJ (n), is monotonic in n, which means that it is suﬃcient
to check the derivatives of V PJ at the lower and upper boundaries of the region. At the lower
boundary of the joint region given by (25) we have XJ(n) = XPI , and Eq. (52) applies here, too.
At the upper boundary we ﬁnd that XJ (n) = X∗(KB). The derivative is given by
(53)
∂V PJ (n)
∂n
∣∣∣∣
C=
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β
Y Gn ΔK
= ∂p
H
n
∂n
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)− ( X
X∗(KB)
)β (
X∗(KB)−KB − qH1−qHΔK
)]
≥ 0.
As V PJ (n) is monotonic in n the investor’s value increases for all possible n in the joint region.
Appendix G. Multiple effort levels
Assume now that each innovator can choose between m multiple eﬀort levels e ∈ {1, 2, ...,m},
where eﬀort level 1 is the lowest eﬀort level, equal to L, and m is the highest possible eﬀort level.
Each eﬀort level e corresponds to an eﬀort cost ξe and probability of drawing a good project qe.
We let an increase in eﬀort imply an increase in eﬀort cost and in the probability of a good project.
Multiple eﬀort levels mean that the investor optimizes over eﬀort levels in addition to the other
control variables. The ex ante constraints of the investor’s optimization problem, in Eqs. (11)-(12),
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are thus changed as follows:
qe′
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qe′)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξe′ ≥ qe′′
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qe′′)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξe′′ ,
where
e′′ = argmax
e =e′
{
qe
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qe)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξe
}
.
We rearrange the ex ante incentive compatibility constraint as follows,
(54)
(
X
XG
)β
SG −
(
X
XB
)β
SB ≥ Δ
′ξ
Δ′q
,
where Δ′ξ ≡ ξe′ − ξe′′ and Δ′q ≡ qe′ − qe′′ . This constraint corresponds to Eq. (11) in the case of
only two eﬀort levels.
The ex ante participation constraint equals,
qe′
(
X
XG
)β
SG + (1− qe′)
(
X
XB
)β
SB − ξe′ ≥ 0.
The reorganized ex ante participation constraint is given by,
(55)
(
X
XG
)β
SG +
1− qe′
qe′
(
X
XB
)β
SB ≥ ξe′
qe′
,
and is analogous to Eq. (12) in the case of two eﬀort levels. The ex post constraints are identical
to Eqs. (13)-(15).
As the constraints in Eqs. (54)-(55) have the same structure as the ex ante constraints in two
eﬀort levels case in Eqs. (11) and (12), the compact form constraint corresponding to Eq. (17) in
the two eﬀort levels case, has the same structure too. The compact form constraint in the case of
multiple eﬀort levels equals
(56)
(
X
XG
)β
SG ≥ max
{(
X
XB
)β
Y Bn ΔK,
Δ′ξ
Δ′q
,
ξe′
qe′
}
,
which is similar to the case of only two eﬀort levels as we end up with three similar regions (the
private information region, the joint region, and the hidden eﬀort region). This means that the
optimal investment triggers and compensation functions will be the same as for the two eﬀort levels
case.
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When we extend the model to allow for multiple eﬀort levels the investor maximizes the value
function with respect to eﬀort for each possible value of n, i.e., the investor maximizes a value
function similar to Eq. (31), with qH replaced by qe,
(57)
max
e
n
[
(qe
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
Y Gn (X
∗(KG)−KG)− SG∗)+ (1− qe)
(
X
XB∗
)β
Y Bn (X
B∗ −KB)
]
.
Evaluation of the value function in Eq. (57) in the private information region leads to,
(58)
max
e
(1− (1− qe)n)
(
X
X∗(G)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG)+(1−qe)n
(
X
XPI(qe)
)β (
XPI(qe)−KB − qe
1− qeΔK
)
,
where we use the notation XPI = XPI(qe) to emphasize that the optimal investment trigger in the
private information region depends on the level of eﬀort, e. In this region the innovators’ cost of
eﬀort is not a binding constraint in the investor’s optimization problem, and therefore the value
is increasing in eﬀort e: it leads to a higher probability of each innovator drawing a good project,
qe. In other words, the value of an increase in eﬀort level will be positive as long as one is in the
private information region. This means that for any n the investor will provide the innovators with
incentives to exert more eﬀort until private information is not a binding constraint.
In the joint region and hidden eﬀort region there is a trade-oﬀ in the optimal choice of eﬀort
level: a higher eﬀort increases the probability that an innovator’s innovation is of high quality, qe,
but also increases eﬀort costs, ξe. Thus, the investor chooses an eﬀort level such that ﬁrst-best
investment is reached and we conclude that Proposition 6.1 is valid when we allow for multiple
eﬀort levels too. The investor chooses n, and the corresponding optimal eﬀort level, such that her
value is maximized.
Appendix H. Discrete n
In Section 6 we show that in both the private information region and the joint region the
investor’s value increases in n. To ensure that the optimal number of innovators are found in the
hidden eﬀort region when n is discrete we require that there is at least one value of n in this region:
Assumption H.1. We assume that parameter values are given such that there exists at least one
value of n in the hidden eﬀort region.
40 INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND INVESTMENT TIMING
We then ﬁnd the optimal n by increasing the number of innovators in the hidden eﬀort region
as long as the marginal value of inviting one more innovator to participate in the contest is higher
than the cost of inviting him, i.e. we increase n as long as
(59)
ΔpHn
{(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG))− ( X
X∗(KB)
)β (
X∗(KB)−KB)
}
− qHC(qH , ξH) ≥ 0,
where ΔpHn ≡ pHn − pHn−1 > 0. Since ΔpHn is positive and decreasing in n, and the last term is a
negative constant, we ﬁnd an optimum in the hidden eﬀort region.
Appendix I. Proofs of comparative statics analyzes in Section 7
I.1. Proof of Proposition 7.1: Properties of the optimal contract as a function of X.
The derivative of n∗ with respect to X is given by
(60)
dn∗
dX
= − β
ln(1− qH)X > 0.
Evaluation of the ﬁrst derivative of V PHE(n
∗) with respect to X leads to the expression,
(61)
dV PHE(n
∗)
dX
=
β
X
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−K)− qH− ln(1− qH)C(ξH , qH)
]
,
which is positive as C(ξH , qH) ≤
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
ΔK by Eq. (26) and qH− ln(1−qH) < 1 for 0 < qH < 1.
The second derivative V PHE(n
∗) with respect to X is then given by
(62)
d2V PHE(n
∗)
dX2
= β(β−1)Xβ−2
[(
1
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−K)− (−1)X−2β qH− ln(1− qH)C(ξH , qH)
]
≥ 0.
The contract winner’s value of the contract, C(ξH ,qH)
Y G
n∗
, increases in X as Y Gn∗ is negative in X,
(63)
dY G
n∗
dX =
∂Y G
n∗
∂n∗
dn∗
dX
= (1−qH )
n∗ ln(1−qH )n∗+1−(1−qH )n∗
(n∗)2qH
β
ln(1−qH)X < 0,
as (1− qH)n ln(1− qH)n+ 1− (1− qH)n > 0 for all n ≥ 1 and 0 < qH < 1.
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The derivative of the contract winner’s value relative to value of a high quality investment project,
d
(
C(ξH ,qH )/Y
G
n∗
V (X,KG)
)
dX ≤ 0, as
(64)
d
(
Y Gn∗V (X,K
G)
)
dX
=
1
n∗qH
β
X
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β (
X∗(KG)−KG) [1− (1− qH)n∗
n∗ ln(1− qH) + 1
]
≥ 0.
Eq. (64) is positive since −1 < 1−(1−qH )nn ln(1−qH ) < 0 for n > 0 and 0 < qH < 1.
I.2. Proof of Proposition 7.2. Diﬀerentiation of n∗ with respect to β leads to
(65)
∂n∗
∂β
= A
[
(KG)1−β ln
(
X
X∗(KG)
)
− (KB)1−β ln
(
X
X∗(KG)
)]
,
where
A =
(
X β−1β
)β
− ln(1− qH)
[(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
KG −
(
X
X∗(KB)
)β
KB
] > 0.
The ﬁrst derivative in Eq. (65) is positive, as the exponential of the right-hand side of Eq. (65) is
larger than 1,
exp
{
A
[
(KG)1−β ln
(
X
X∗(KG)
)
− (KB)1−β ln
(
X
X∗(KG)
)]}
=
(
X
X∗(KG)
)A(KG)1−β
(
X
X∗(KB)
)A(KB)1−β > 1,
which means that the right-hand side of equation (65) is positive. Hence we ﬁnd that
(66)
dn∗
dσ
=
∂n∗
∂β
dβ
dσ
< 0,
since ∂n
∗
∂β > 0 and
dβ
dσ < 0.
The ﬁrst derivative of V PHE(n
∗) with respect to σ is given by
dV PHE(n
∗)
dσ
=
dV PHE
dβ
dβ
dσ
,
where
(67)
dV PHE
dβ
=
[
∂V PHE
∂pHn∗
∂pHn∗
∂n∗
+
∂V PHE
∂n∗
]
dn∗
dβ
+
∂V PHE
∂β
.
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Evaluation of Eq. (67) leads to
dV PHE
dβ
=
(
X
X∗(KG)
)β
KG ln
(
X
X∗(KG)
)
β − 1 − qHC
dn∗
dβ
> 0.
As dβdσ < 0, we obtain
dV PHE
dσ < 0.
I.3. Proof of Proposition 7.3. The ﬁrst derivative of n∗ with respect to qH can be written as
(68)
dn∗
dqH
=
n∗ + 1−qhqH + ln(1− qH)−1
ln(1− qH)(1 − qH) < 0
since n∗ + 1−qhqH + ln(1− qH)−1 > 0 for qH ∈ (0, 1) and n∗ ≥ 1 .
The total derivative of V PHE(n
∗) with respect to qH is given by
dV PHE(n
∗)
dqH
=
∂V PHE(n
∗)
∂n∗ dn
∗dqH
= −(1− qH)n−1
[
V (X,KG)− V (X,KB)] (1−qHqH + ln(1− qH)−1
)
+n∗
{
ΔqL
Δq2H
, 0
}
− qHC dn∗dqH > 0,
since 1−qHqH + ln(1− qH)−1 < 0.
The derivative of C(ξH , qH)/Y Gn∗ with respect to qH is equal to
d(C(ξH , qH)/Y
G
n∗)
dqH
=
∂C
∂qH
Y Gn∗ − C(ξH , qH)∂Y
G
n∗
dqH
(Y Gn∗)
2
< 0,
since ∂(Δξ)/(qH−qL)∂qH < 0,
∂(ξH )/qH
∂qH
< 0, and
dY G
n∗
dqH
= (1−qH )
n∗−1qHn∗−1+(1−qH )n∗
n∗q2H
− (1−qH)n
∗
ln(1−qH )n∗+1−(1−qH )n∗
(n∗)2qH
n∗ 1−qH
qH
+ln(1−qH)−1
ln(1−qH )(1−qH ) > 0.
I.4. Proof of Proposition 7.4. First-order diﬀerentiation of n∗ with respect to ξH equals
dn∗
dξH
=
1
C(ξH , qH) ln(1− qH)
dC(ξH , qH)
dξH
< 0.
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Value of observable asset X 150
Risk-adjusted drift μ 0.00
Volatility σ 0.15
Risk-free interest rate r 0.05
Privately observed investment cost if high quality project KG 75
Privately observed investment cost if low quality project KB 125
Probability of a high quality project if high eﬀort qH 0.45
Probability of a high quality project if low eﬀort qL 0.10
Cost of high eﬀort ξH 1.30
Cost of low eﬀort ξL 0.25
Resulting values:
First-best investment trigger of high quality project X∗(KG) 120
First-best investment trigger of low quality project X∗(KB) 200
Investment trigger of low quality project
when only private information constraint binds XPI 265.45
Table 1. Base case parameter values.
Figure 1. An overview of the stages of the model.
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XB*
[H
Figure 2. The ﬁrst-best trigger X∗(KB) corresponds to the optimal trigger when
we have no private information or hidden eﬀort problems, and is given by the lower
horizontal line in the ﬁgure. The four other curves represent optimal investment
triggers under private information and hidden eﬀort. The upper horizontal parts
of these curves correspond to regions where only the private information constraint
binds. In this case there is a large investment deviation from ﬁrst-best trigger, which
results in ineﬃcient investment triggers and contracts that are not renegotiation-
proof. In the region where the investment triggers decline towards the ﬁrst-best
trigger, both the private information and the eﬀort constraints bind. When only
one of the eﬀort constraint binds, the optimal investment trigger equals the ﬁrst-best
trigger. Note that as the investor increases the number of competing innovators,
the intervals of eﬀort cost levels in which private information constraints bind are
reduced. Thus, as the number of competitors increase, the optimal investment policy
is pushed toward ﬁrst-best investment.
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sG
[H
Figure 3. In the region of ξH -values where the compensation s
G is independent
of ξH , only the private information constraint binds. The graphs illustrate that as
n increases the informational rents decreases, but also that the region of ξH -values
where private information is a binding constraint decreases. In the region where
eﬀort is a binding constraint, sG increases linearly in ξH , and also increases in n.
Note also that the hidden eﬀort region increases in n, and that the compensation
increases more steeply in ξH for a higher value of n.
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XPI
HE region, n=1 PI region, n=1
HE region, n=2 PI region, n=2
HE region, n=5
Figure 4. The contract winner’s relative share as a function of the observable part
of the asset value, X.
X=X*(KG)
HE region, n=1PI region, n=1
PI region, n=2
HE region, n=5
HE region, n=2
Figure 5. The contract winner’s relative share as a function of volatility, σ.
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HE region, n=1PI region, n=1
HE region, n=2PI region, n=2
HE region, n=5
Figure 6. The contract winner’s relative share as a function of each agent’s cost
of high eﬀort, ξH .
PI region Hidden effort
Figure 7. The upper curve represents the principal’s project value as a function
of the number of agents, n, in the ﬁrst-best case. The lower curve gives optimal
project values given agency problems.
